Italian expansion, 1933-1940
Conceptual understanding
KEY CONCEPTS:
* Change
* Continuity
* Perspective
KEY QUESTIONS:
* Examine the reasons for Italy pursuing more expansionist foreign policy in the 1930s.
* To what extent was there continuity in Italian foreign policy in the 1930s?
* Discuss the consequences of foreign policy in the 1930s for Italy.
* Change
* Continuity
* Perspective
KEY QUESTIONS:
* Examine the reasons for Italy pursuing more expansionist foreign policy in the 1930s.
* To what extent was there continuity in Italian foreign policy in the 1930s?
* Discuss the consequences of foreign policy in the 1930s for Italy.
Key factors in 1933-1936
Full Document Question: Italy's invasion of Abyssinia/ Ethiopia
Source A
Mussolini to the National Assembly of the Fascist Party in March 1934:
"The historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia and Africa. South and east are the compass points towards which the interest and will of Italians are. To the north, there is nothing to do, to the west nothing either, either in Europe or beyond the sea. Of all the great powers, the closest to Africa and Asia is Italy. -- Italy's positions in the Mediterranean gives it the right and duty to accomplish this task." (Quoted in Overy & Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 211-212.)
Source B
A cartoon drawn by David Low, published in Evening Standard in May 1935:

(Click the picture!)
Source C
Richard Overy & Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War: The Origins of World War II (2009), 213-215:
"-- at the height of the Ethiopian crisis, in 1935, he [Mussolini] told the French ambassador to Rome: 'Cost what it may, I will avenge Adowa.'*) -- Ethiopia was regarded as a 'natural' area for Italian expansion. There were strong economic arguments put forward for conquest. Mussolini talked of exporting ten million Italians to the colonies. --The suggestion of limitless mineral riches, even oil, under Ethiopian's barren soil was a further spur (though much oil remained undiscovered, beneath the sand of Italy's other colony, Libya). Yet the most compelling arguments were the glory than an treasure. The king was won over to the strategy by promises of new titles and subjects. Revenge on Ethiopia was a propaganda prize of great value to Mussolini; it also had the advantage that the area was already one that the rest of the world had come to regard as a sphere of Italian influence. The politica periferica promised real gains at much less risk than a policy in Europe. -- Ethiopia was a risk which Mussolini took in the end because of his desire to 'act', to keep Fascism on the boil by satisfying the nationalist chorus for Italian glory."
Source D
Overy and Wheatcroft write about the timing of the invasion:
"Italy had sponsored Ethiopian membership of the League of Nations in 1923 against Western opposition; in 1928 Ethiopia was bound closely with a treaty of friendship and trade. In 1932 Mussolini ordered work to begin on plans to turn friendship into formal control. -- The exact timing of the planned assault on Ethiopia owed much to circumstances. Italian leaders could see that Ethiopia was rapidly building up armed forces of her own, and might well prove a more difficult conquest only a few years hence. Adowa had to be avenged, not repeated. Ethiopia was already slipping away from earlier dependence on Italian trade. By 1934 80 per cent of her imports came from Japan; much of the investment in the region game from Britain and and the United States, undermining the Italian position throughout East Africa. Italy's historic influence was strongly challenged by Japan, which saw Ethiopia as an independent empire like herself, resisting European encroachment. -- Mussolini was all too aware of the revival of Germany and of German rearmament. He was anxious not to let the Ethiopian affair weaken his position in Europe at the Benner frontier [between Italy and Austria]; an attack in 1935 would give him time to rearm and complete the operation before German military strength had revived too much." (Overy & Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 214-215).
Question One, part one (3 marks): According to Source A, what were the matters that guided Italian expansionism in the mid-1930s?
Question One, part two (2 marks): What is the message of the Source B?
Question Two (4 marks): With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the values and limitations of Source A for historians studying the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
Question Three (6 marks): Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A, B and C regarding Mussolini’s motives for invading Abyssinia.
Question Four (9 marks:) Using the sources A - D and your own knowledge, analyse the reasons for the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
*) http://www.africanews.com/2017/03/02/ethiopia-commemorates-defeat-of-italian-forces-at-1896-battle-of-adwa/ ('Adwa' = Adowa)
Mussolini to the National Assembly of the Fascist Party in March 1934:
"The historical objectives of Italy have two names: Asia and Africa. South and east are the compass points towards which the interest and will of Italians are. To the north, there is nothing to do, to the west nothing either, either in Europe or beyond the sea. Of all the great powers, the closest to Africa and Asia is Italy. -- Italy's positions in the Mediterranean gives it the right and duty to accomplish this task." (Quoted in Overy & Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 211-212.)
Source B
A cartoon drawn by David Low, published in Evening Standard in May 1935:
(Click the picture!)
Source C
Richard Overy & Andrew Wheatcroft, The Road to War: The Origins of World War II (2009), 213-215:
"-- at the height of the Ethiopian crisis, in 1935, he [Mussolini] told the French ambassador to Rome: 'Cost what it may, I will avenge Adowa.'*) -- Ethiopia was regarded as a 'natural' area for Italian expansion. There were strong economic arguments put forward for conquest. Mussolini talked of exporting ten million Italians to the colonies. --The suggestion of limitless mineral riches, even oil, under Ethiopian's barren soil was a further spur (though much oil remained undiscovered, beneath the sand of Italy's other colony, Libya). Yet the most compelling arguments were the glory than an treasure. The king was won over to the strategy by promises of new titles and subjects. Revenge on Ethiopia was a propaganda prize of great value to Mussolini; it also had the advantage that the area was already one that the rest of the world had come to regard as a sphere of Italian influence. The politica periferica promised real gains at much less risk than a policy in Europe. -- Ethiopia was a risk which Mussolini took in the end because of his desire to 'act', to keep Fascism on the boil by satisfying the nationalist chorus for Italian glory."
Source D
Overy and Wheatcroft write about the timing of the invasion:
"Italy had sponsored Ethiopian membership of the League of Nations in 1923 against Western opposition; in 1928 Ethiopia was bound closely with a treaty of friendship and trade. In 1932 Mussolini ordered work to begin on plans to turn friendship into formal control. -- The exact timing of the planned assault on Ethiopia owed much to circumstances. Italian leaders could see that Ethiopia was rapidly building up armed forces of her own, and might well prove a more difficult conquest only a few years hence. Adowa had to be avenged, not repeated. Ethiopia was already slipping away from earlier dependence on Italian trade. By 1934 80 per cent of her imports came from Japan; much of the investment in the region game from Britain and and the United States, undermining the Italian position throughout East Africa. Italy's historic influence was strongly challenged by Japan, which saw Ethiopia as an independent empire like herself, resisting European encroachment. -- Mussolini was all too aware of the revival of Germany and of German rearmament. He was anxious not to let the Ethiopian affair weaken his position in Europe at the Benner frontier [between Italy and Austria]; an attack in 1935 would give him time to rearm and complete the operation before German military strength had revived too much." (Overy & Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 214-215).
Question One, part one (3 marks): According to Source A, what were the matters that guided Italian expansionism in the mid-1930s?
Question One, part two (2 marks): What is the message of the Source B?
Question Two (4 marks): With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the values and limitations of Source A for historians studying the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
Question Three (6 marks): Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources A, B and C regarding Mussolini’s motives for invading Abyssinia.
Question Four (9 marks:) Using the sources A - D and your own knowledge, analyse the reasons for the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.
*) http://www.africanews.com/2017/03/02/ethiopia-commemorates-defeat-of-italian-forces-at-1896-battle-of-adwa/ ('Adwa' = Adowa)
Italian invasion of Abyssinia
The Abyssinia Crisis, 1935-36 (Road to War - Italy)
[7:55]
> Thinking skills in page 138.
> Thinking skills in page 138.
Italy's intervention to the Spanish Civil War in 1936-39
Mussolini meets Hitler
Hitler at Venice in June 1934
(The first meeting of dictators.) [1:12]
Mussolini at Munich in September 1937
1) Watch two short news films about the 1934 and the 1937 meetings. Is it possible to make conclusions about the personal relations of the two dictators during these periods by using these films as a source? Do you see any change on their mutual relations between these meetings?
2) Listen the commentary of American reporter in the Munich 1937 clip (Available also as written form in the link > 'Transcrìpt'). What is the message of it? [1:34]
2) Listen the commentary of American reporter in the Munich 1937 clip (Available also as written form in the link > 'Transcrìpt'). What is the message of it? [1:34]
Italy's changing diplomatic alignments 1936-38
Mussolini's participation in the Sudetenland crisis talks
The Munich Agreement on 29 September 1938
1) "Mussolini stepped in as a 'peacemaker' at Munich. He was hailed in Europe as the architect of peace. However, it was clear by this time he was now subservient to Hitler."(Quoted from textbook page 145). Is there any evidence for these characterizations in the film on the link?
2) The weakness of Britain and France at the Munich Conference encouraged Mussolini to take advantage of this. What according to Source A in pages 145-146 were now key foreign policy aims for Mussolini?
2) The weakness of Britain and France at the Munich Conference encouraged Mussolini to take advantage of this. What according to Source A in pages 145-146 were now key foreign policy aims for Mussolini?
Why did Italy invade Albania in April 1939?
> Source skills in page 148.
The Pact of Steel, 22 May 1939
= The Pact of Friendship and Alliance between Germany and Italy
> Source skills in page 182: Analyse the content of the Pact from Italian perspective.
> Source skills in page 182: Analyse the content of the Pact from Italian perspective.
Why did Italy remain a non-belligerent in 1939?
Mussolini to Hitler in May 1939 (a few days after the signing of the Pact of Steel): "Only after 1943 can a war have the greatest prospect of success."
Excracts from the diary of Count Ciano, Italian foreign minister:
* On 4 July 1939: "From Berlin, no communication, which confirms that nothing dramatic is in offing."
* On 20 July: "Intelligence reports indicated troop movements on a vast scale. It is possible that all this should take a place without our knowledge after so many protestasions of peace made by our Axis colleagues? We shall see."
* In the beginning of August: "The outbreak of war at this time would be folly. Our preparations are not such as to allow us to believe that victory will be certain. Now there are no more than even chances. On the other hand, within three years, the chances will be four to one. Mussolini has constantly in mind the idea of an international peace conference."
*On 6 August (a day before his meeting with Hitler in Salzburg): "The Duce (= Mussolini) is more than ever convinced of the need of delaying the conflict...I should frankly inform the Germans that we must avoid conflict with Poland, since it will be impossible to localize it, and a general war would be disastrous for everybody. Never has the Duce spoken of the need for peace so unreservedly and with so much warmth."
*On 7 August on the train to Salzburg Ciano told his aides that Germany could not possibly risk war: "We will talk to the English, to the French, to the Poles. We will persuade them."
* In Salzburg Ciano was immediately informed by Ribbentrop, his German colleague, that Germany planned to attack Poland: "I return to Rome completely disgusted with the Germans, with their leader, and their way of doing things: They have betrayed us and lied to us."
(Source: Overy & Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 234-236.)
TASKS:
1) Why did Italy not join the war in 1939 despite its Pact with Germany?
2) Read page 150: Is there any other reasons?
3) Compare and contrast Italy's neutrality in 1914 and 1939.
Excracts from the diary of Count Ciano, Italian foreign minister:
* On 4 July 1939: "From Berlin, no communication, which confirms that nothing dramatic is in offing."
* On 20 July: "Intelligence reports indicated troop movements on a vast scale. It is possible that all this should take a place without our knowledge after so many protestasions of peace made by our Axis colleagues? We shall see."
* In the beginning of August: "The outbreak of war at this time would be folly. Our preparations are not such as to allow us to believe that victory will be certain. Now there are no more than even chances. On the other hand, within three years, the chances will be four to one. Mussolini has constantly in mind the idea of an international peace conference."
*On 6 August (a day before his meeting with Hitler in Salzburg): "The Duce (= Mussolini) is more than ever convinced of the need of delaying the conflict...I should frankly inform the Germans that we must avoid conflict with Poland, since it will be impossible to localize it, and a general war would be disastrous for everybody. Never has the Duce spoken of the need for peace so unreservedly and with so much warmth."
*On 7 August on the train to Salzburg Ciano told his aides that Germany could not possibly risk war: "We will talk to the English, to the French, to the Poles. We will persuade them."
* In Salzburg Ciano was immediately informed by Ribbentrop, his German colleague, that Germany planned to attack Poland: "I return to Rome completely disgusted with the Germans, with their leader, and their way of doing things: They have betrayed us and lied to us."
(Source: Overy & Wheatcroft, The Road to War, 234-236.)
TASKS:
1) Why did Italy not join the war in 1939 despite its Pact with Germany?
2) Read page 150: Is there any other reasons?
3) Compare and contrast Italy's neutrality in 1914 and 1939.
Italy and the road to war
A documentary film
1) Watch from 32 to 39 minutes:
Analyse Italy's relations with Germany and Britain.
2) Watch from 39 minutes until the end:
Why did Italy participate in war in 1940?
Analyse Italy's relations with Germany and Britain.
2) Watch from 39 minutes until the end:
Why did Italy participate in war in 1940?
Why did Italy participate in war in 1940?
Pages 150-152.