

**HISTORY  
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL  
PAPER 1**

Monday 10 November 2003 (afternoon)

1 hour

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| <b>SOURCE BOOKLET</b> |
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**SOURCE BOOKLET - INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES**

- Do not open this booklet until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for paper 1.
  - Section A page 2
  - Section B page 5
  - Section C page 8

*Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses in square brackets [...]; minor changes are not indicated.*

## **SECTION A**

### **Prescribed Subject 1 The USSR under Stalin, 1924 to 1941**

*The following sources relate to Stalin's use of terror and purges between 1934 and 1939.*

**SOURCE A**      *Extract from a letter published in 1936 in a Russian Menshevik journal by Boris Nicolaevsky in which he records a conversation he had with Nikolai Bukharin in Spring 1936.*

The trend was in quite the opposite direction: not toward reconciliation inside the party, but toward intensification of the terror inside the party to its logical conclusion, to the stage of physical extermination of all those whose party past might make them opponents of Stalin or aspirants [rivals] to his power. Today, I have not the slightest doubt that it was at that very period, between the murder of Kirov and the second Kamenev Trial, that Stalin made his decision and mapped out his plan of “reforms”, an essential component part of which was the trial of the sixteen and other trials yet to come.

**SOURCE B**      *Operational Order distributed by the Head of the NKVD, 30 July 1937.*

1. All repressed kulaks, criminals, and other anti-Soviet elements are to be divided into two categories:
  - (a) The first category are the most hostile of the listed elements. They are subject to immediate arrest, and after their cases have been considered by a three-person tribunal they are TO BE SHOT.
  - (b) In the second category are the other less active though also hostile elements. They are subject to arrest and imprisonment in a camp for 8 to 10 years, and the most evil and socially dangerous of these, to confinement for the same period in prison, as determined by the three-person tribunal.
2. In accordance with data determined by the people's commissars of the republics' NKVDs and the heads of regional administrations of the NKVD, the following numbers of individuals are subject to repression.

|                      | <b>First<br/>Category</b> | <b>Second<br/>Category</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Azerbaidzhan SSR  | 1 500                     | 3 750                      | 5 250        |
| 2. Armenian SSR      | 500                       | 1 000                      | 1 500        |
| 3. Belorussian SSR   | 2 000                     | 10 000                     | 12 000       |
| [...]                |                           |                            |              |
| 39. Leningrad region | 4 000                     | 10 000                     | 14 000       |
| 40. Moscow region    | 5 000                     | 30 000                     | 35 000       |
| <br>NKVD camps       | <br>10 000                | <br>-                      | <br>10 000   |
| <br>Total            | <br>72 950                | <br>177 500                | <br>250 450  |

The operation is to begin on 5 August 1937 and is to be completed in four months.

**SOURCE C** *Extract from Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", to the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956.*

Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet State was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated and socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet government.

**SOURCE D** *Extract from a conversation between Molotov and Felix Chuev in April 1982 when Molotov was 92 years old. First published in Moscow in 1991.*

**Molotov:** Of course it is sad and regrettable that there were so many such people, but I consider the terror of the late 1930s was necessary. Of course, there would have been fewer victims, had things been done more cautiously, but Stalin insisted on being doubly sure: spare no one, but guarantee a reliable situation during the war and after the war, for a long period – and that in my opinion was achieved. I do not deny that I supported that line. I simply could not keep track of every individual person. But people like Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev and Kamenev were linked with one another. It was difficult to draw a precise line – at which it was possible to stop.

**SOURCE E** *Extract from **Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy**, Dmitri Volkogonov, London 1991.*

He [Stalin] knew that the show trials would enhance his power further, since the people and the party could not fail to draw the lesson that any opposition was hopeless. He used these trials to install a system of mutual social control, by which everyone watched everyone else and only he remained beyond surveillance and informers.

On the other hand, the trials were so arranged that Stalin could remain in the shadows. He made very few public pronouncements on the trials and for most of the population his true role was unknown. This created the illusion that the enemies and spies were being tried by the people themselves. Had the whole nation in fact been responsible for running the trials, it is certain that the result would have been the same.

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## **SECTION B**

### **Prescribed Subject 2 The emergence and development of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 1946 to 1964**

*The following sources relate to the collectivization programmes introduced in China after 1952 by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung).*

**SOURCE A**      *Extract from a speech by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 11 October 1955, which comments on the progress of agrarian reform in China.*

The peasants are no longer satisfied with the alliance we formed with them in the past on the basis of the agrarian revolution. They are beginning to forget about the benefits they reaped from that alliance. They should now be given new benefits, which means socialism. The peasants have not yet attained collective prosperity, and grain and industrial raw materials are far from sufficient. In these circumstances it is likely that the bourgeoisie will find fault with us and attack us on this score. But in a few years we shall witness an entirely new situation, namely, an alliance between the working class and the peasantry on a new basis, an alliance more consolidated than ever.

The old alliance to oppose the landlords, overthrow the local despots and distribute land was a temporary one; it has become unstable after a period of stability. Since the agrarian reform, polarization has taken place among the peasants. If we have nothing new to offer them and cannot help them raise their productivity, increase their income and attain collective prosperity, the poor ones will no longer trust us and will feel that there is no point in following the Communist Party.

**SOURCE B** *Extract from an address to the Conference of World Communist Parties by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), November 1957.*

At the moment I sense that the international situation has come to a turning-point [...]. It is characterized by the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism [...]. I think we can say that we have left the Western World behind us. Are they far behind us? Or just a tiny bit behind us? As I see it – and maybe I am a bit adventurist in this – I say that we have left them behind us once and for all.

**SOURCE C** *Extract from a press release by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, August 1958.*

The people have taken to organizing themselves along military lines, working with militancy, and leading a collective life, and this has raised the political consciousness of the 500 million peasants still further. Community dining rooms, kindergartens, nurseries, sewing groups, barber shops, public baths, happy homes for the aged, agricultural middle schools, “red and expert” schools, are leading the peasants toward a happier collective life and further fostering ideas of collectivism among the peasant masses. In the present circumstances, the establishment of people’s communes with all-round management of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side occupations, and fishery, where industry (the worker), agriculture (the peasant), exchange (the trader), culture and education (the student), and military affairs (the militiaman) merge into one, is the fundamental policy to guide the peasants to accelerate socialist construction, complete the building of socialism ahead of time, and carry out the gradual transition to communism.

**SOURCE D** *Table taken from **The People’s Republic of China since 1949**, a general history textbook, by Michael Lynch, London 1998. Lynch advises caution when using these statistics.*

***China’s Agricultural Record 1952–62***

| <b>Year</b> | <b>Grain Production<br/>(Millions tonnes)</b> | <b>Meat Production<br/>(Millions tonnes)</b> | <b>Index of Gross<br/>Output Value of Agriculture</b> |
|-------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| 1952        | 163.9                                         | 3.4                                          | 100.0                                                 |
| 1953        | 166.8                                         | 3.8                                          | 103.1                                                 |
| 1954        | 169.5                                         | 3.9                                          | 106.6                                                 |
| 1955        | 183.9                                         | 3.3                                          | 114.7                                                 |
| 1956        | 192.8                                         | 3.4                                          | 120.5                                                 |
| 1957        | 195.1                                         | 4.0                                          | 124.8                                                 |
| 1958        | 200.0                                         | 4.3                                          | 127.8                                                 |
| 1959        | 170.0                                         | 2.6                                          | 110.4                                                 |
| 1960        | 143.5                                         | 1.3                                          | 96.4                                                  |
| 1961        | 147.5                                         | 1.2                                          | 94.1                                                  |
| 1962        | 160.0                                         | 1.9                                          | 99.9                                                  |

**SOURCE E**                      *Extract from **Mao, a biography of Mao Zedong** (Mao Tse-tung), by Jonathan Spence, London 1999.*

The Great Leap Forward ended in catastrophe and famine, a famine that between 1960 and 1961 cost at least 20 million lives. The Great Leap, in Mao's mind, would combine the imperatives of large scale cooperative agriculture with a close-to-utopian vision of the ending of distinctions between occupations, sexes, ages, and levels of education. By compressing the hundreds of thousands of existing cooperatives (the number had passed 700 000 by late 1957) into around 20 000 giant communes, with all land owned by the state and worked in common, Mao believed that China as a whole would reap the immense benefits of scale and of flexibility. Communal kitchens and laundries would release women from chores to perform more constructive agricultural tasks; rural labourers would learn to build backyard steel furnaces and supplement China's iron and steel production in the urban factories.

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## SECTION C

### **Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979**

*The following sources relate to United States involvement in the Vietnam War in the 1960s.*

**SOURCE A**                      *Extract from **The Cold War** by Richard A. Schwartz, North Carolina 1997.*

The Vietnam War must be viewed within its Cold War context. It began in the early 1960s as a classical American Cold War effort to halt Communist expansion in the underdeveloped regions by supporting a local regime to oppose the Communists. By the time it ended in 1973, however, it transformed both the Cold War and the United States itself by forcing Americans to examine the assumptions behind the war and the far reaching consequences it carried.

**SOURCE B**                      *Extract from the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 10 August 1964, Joint Resolution of US Congress.*

Naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters; and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbours and the nations joined with them in the collective defence of their freedom; the United States is assisting the peoples of South East Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

**SOURCE C**                      *Extract from **Peace Without Conquest**, a speech by Lyndon B. Johnson at Johns Hopkins University, 7 April 1965.*

Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. [...] It is the principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Vietnam.

The world as it is in Asia is not a serene or peaceful place. [...] North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam. Its object is total conquest. [...] The nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy.

Over this war – and all Asia – is the deepening shadow of Communist China. China is a nation which is helping the forces of violence in almost every continent. The contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.

Why are we in South Vietnam? [...] because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. [...] over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence.

We are also there to strengthen world order. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all people in the value of an American commitment. The result would be increased unrest and instability, even wide war. We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a minute that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to the conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied.

**SOURCE D**

*Editorial cartoon by Herblock in the **Washington Post**, 17 June 1965. [The tall man on the escalator is President Johnson, the other person represents the public.]*

**June 17, 1965**

**“OUR POSITION HASN’T CHANGED AT ALL”**



**SOURCE E**

*Extract from **In Retrospect: The Lessons and Tragedy of Vietnam** by Robert McNamara, New York 1995.*

If we are to learn from our experience in Vietnam, we must first pinpoint our failures. [...]

We misjudged then – as we have since – the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries (in this case, North Vietnam and the Vietcong, supported by China and the Soviet Union), and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of their actions.

We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people (in this case, the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong) to fight and die for their beliefs and values – and we continue to do so today in many parts of the world.

We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the advantages and disadvantages of a large-scale US military involvement in South East Asia before we initiated the action.