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Question 21: Evaluate the contributions of Cavour and Mazzini to the unification of Italy.

[Section 11: Italy (1815 -1871) and Germany (1815 -1890)]



Intro

#1 - MAZZINI: Ideological

#2 - Mazzini: Cultivating Garibaldi

#3 - Cavour: Internal

#4 - Cavour: diplomacy

#5 - OTHER FACTORS (Austria, France, Europe etc)



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Despite the unitarian myth that Italian unification of 1870 was as a result of an allegiance between forces of republicanism, in Mazzini, and forces of monarchism, in Cavour, the reality is somewhat different. While it is true that both played vital roles in the Italian unification, it seems that whilst Mazzini's contributions were chiefly ideological, Cavour's were related to strengthening Piedmont-sardinia ~~pro~~ both domestically and diplomatically. Ultimately, the nature of unification, a form of piemontese aggrandisement, demonstrates that while Mazzini may have brought impetus to the republican movement, Cavour's contributions were far more significant. As Salvemendi says "In reality there were winners and losers; Cavour the winner, and Mazzini and Garibaldi the losers."



Firstly, it is true that Mazzini played an integral role in the Italian republican movement. For example, in establishing



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"Young Italy" in 1827 following the failed attempts at revolution in Naples and Piedmont in 1820, Mazzini brought the concept of "Italy" as a political entity onto the nationalist agenda. Furthermore, as a member of the Carbonari, boasting a membership of 60,000, it is fair to suggest that Mazzini brought ideological contribution. However, more recent studies, such as that of Denis Mack Smith, describe such organisations as "loosely organised", therefore dispelling the myth that ideological pressure led to Italian unity, as proposed by historians such as Croce.

Nevertheless, one area where Mazzini was significant was in cultivating the image and reputation of Garibaldi, who became a member of Young Italy in 1831. The fact that they jointly co-led the triumvirate in the defence of the Roman Republic in 1848-9, against a French Garrison, resulted in significant monetary donations of 20,000 men, led to significant monetary donations to Garibaldi from Britain, which ultimately aided his expedition on Sicily on 11th April 1860. Although Mazzini undoubtedly cultivated Garibaldi's image, akin to Jesus Christ, the link between Mazzini and unification remains tenuous. The fact that he was exiled following 1850, with Metternich describing him as "the most dangerous man", and when he returned in 1857 his political activism was not the same, demonstrates that his tangible contributions are limited.

Following on from this, the fact that unification was, as C. C. Clague describes it, a "top down process" demonstrates that top-down leadership was necessary, and that came with Cavour. Firstly, his economic contributions, of expanding the railway following his appointment as prime minister in 1852, such as the Cavour Canal, irrigation schemes at Vercelli and Novara, expansion of the railway to 1/3 of all in the Italian states, along with the increase in public spending to 725 million lire, demonstrates that Cavour



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placed Piedmont-Sardinia in a position where it was able to lead, a contribution which Mazzini was unable to make due to his lack of constitutional ~~power~~ channels to exercise such a power. Furthermore, Cavour's "Connubio", a centrist alliance eliminating the threat of the Municipali, as well as his decision to ~~keep~~ the "Statuto", albeit with a diluted enfranchisement of 2.1, further placed Piedmont in a strong position. However, although Crocchi suggests that this was Cavour's intention, it is notable that it was not until the wars of 1859, 1866 and the 1871 Franco-Prussian war that "Italy" in its entirety came to fruition.

As a consequence, it also is important to consider Cavour's diplomatic contribution that led to Italian Unity, or more specifically Piedmontese *agrandissement*. The decision to send 18,000 to help in the Crimean war in 1855, the subsequent diplomatic courting of Napoleon at the Paris Peace Talks 1856, which ultimately culminated in the pact of Plombières 1858, was essential to Italian unity as it garnered French support for the 1859 war, which would result in the acquisition of Lombardy. Although the Italian's role in the war is somewhat questionable, with the Peace of Villafranca being unilaterally negotiated by France ~~as~~ as a result of Italian ineptitude, it seems that Cavour's contribution in this respect was essential. Similarly, the fact that Cavour successfully negotiated the Handshake at Teano in October 1860, albeit forced by Garibaldi, demonstrates his vital contributions, in the sense that this led to the formal acquisition of Sicily and Naples. Further still, the agreement on Venice with Prussia in 1866 as well as the diplomacy exercised in Rome in 1870 demonstrates that Cavour, was to some extent, the driver of unification, albeit for the fact that his hand was often forced.

This however alludes to the argument that Mark Geddes proposes that "Napoleon, and other foreign powers" were indispensable to unification.



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and it certainly seems that although Mazzini to a small extent, and Cavour to a greater extent contributed to Italian unity, unification was as a result of the wider geopolitical situation, such as the French support following the January 1858 Orsini affair and the decline of Austrian influence, who before ~~1848~~ was able to suppress the 1820, 1831 and 1848 revolutions, yet by 1870, had an urban population of a mere 449,000 and joined into the dual monarchy of 1867. Therefore, when evaluating the contributions of any individuals such as Mazzini or Cavour, it is integral to consider the ~~consequence~~ context.

Overall, despite the argument proposed by George Meredith, a romantic poet who is particularly admirable of the unitarian myth that Cavour was "her brain" and Mazzini was "her soul", it seems that while Cavour can be seen as important in the unification process politically, economically and diplomatically, Mazzini's ~~sub~~ contribution is less tangible. Ultimately, as former claims "without a favorable situation, unification would not have come about when it did".



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Question 22: "The Kulturkampf and the anti-socialist campaign were political failures for Bismarck." Discuss.

[Section 11: Italy (1815 -1871) and Germany (1815 -1890)]

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The Kulturkampf, beginning in 1873 and ending in July 1879, and the anti-socialist campaign from 1879 to 1890, are historiographically seen as Bismarck's greatest failings, with many Fulbrook even arguing that "Bismarck had bequeathed a problematic legacy for Germany." While it is true that numerically both the Kulturkampf and the anti-socialist campaign failed to significantly quash these opposition groups in the sense that both remained parliamentary threats to Bismarck, it seems that while the campaign against the socialists was mostly counter-productive the Kulturkampf can be seen as a partial success when considered against the unfavourable political context and a wider geopolitical context. Furthermore, although Bismarck's aim of quashing opposition groups was not satisfied, the fact that he achieved his primary goal of maintaining Prussian dominance indicates a degree of success.

Firstly, in order to analyse the success or failure of the Kulturkampf, it is important to assess the context. Following the 1864 signing of the 1870 doctrine of papal infallibility, as well as the formation of the Zentrum under Ludwig Windthorst, coupled with the stratified North/South divide of Germany, with the protestant North and Catholic South, it seems that Bismarck was in an inherent position of weakness, therein implying that any perceived failure should be considered in this context. Nevertheless, the appointment

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of Albert Falk as minister of religion in 1873, the introduction of the May Laws 1873, the banning of religious marriages in 1874, banning civil marriages failed to eliminate the Catholics. This is shown by the fact that only 30 out of 1,000 priests succumbed to the May Laws, and the Zentrum presence in the Reichstag increased from 61 to 95, as it ~~seem~~ be Kulturkampf seemingly united Catholics against Bismarck. To some extent, this supports the traditional historiographical view point that it was his "greatest failure", insofar as it failed to eliminate the threat of the Zentrum party.

Nevertheless, it seems that a more nuanced interpretation, such as that of Otto Planitz describing it as a "strategy of alternatives" is more adept, suggesting that the Kulturkampf was not a total failure. The fact that despite imprisoning over 2400 priests, as well as imposing strict censorship on Catholic text, Bismarck managed to retain the support of the Zentrum after his subsequent campaign against the socialists supports the fact Bismarck was seemingly able to carry out an exquisite balancing act. Thus, in terms of his over-arching aim of maintaining his own hegemony, it should be seen as a success, as he had counter-intuitively ~~just~~ created an ally. Following on from this, the fact that Bismarck was flexible enough to end the Kulturkampf following the death of Pope Pius, the growing threat of socialism since 1873 recession, and the appeal of an alliance with Austria in 1879 to protect Germany's international position, demonstrates that the Kulturkampf should be seen as a partial retreat, not a political failure.

Nevertheless, his subsequent campaign against the socialists, formally beginning with the 15th July 1879 tariff act, two days after the end of the Kulturkampf, should be seen, on balance, as a political failure. For example, his policy of repression of the socialists, following



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be an assassination attempt by an anarchist in 1876 culminating
 in the passing of the "exceptional laws" of 1878; ~~failed to~~ although
 succeeded in imprisoning over 1500 socialists; should be
 considered as a failure. Although it is important to again assess the
 context, noting that the 1873 recession had led to the rise of the SPD,
 the fact that in 1871 only 0.5 million were voting socialist
 yet by 1890 over 1.5 million were, is perhaps the most
 stark indication that his anti-socialist campaign was counterproductive.
 Nevertheless, although Bismarck maintained power, through his control
 of the Bundestag and Kaiser, the fact that there was an undercurrent
 of discontent supports ~~his~~ Fulbrook's argument that Bismarck
 had cultivated a problematic legacy for Germany. Although it is
 too much to extrapolate, as Steinhilber does, that this directly led to
 the rise of ~~the~~ political radicalism in the 1910s, it should be seen as
 at best, a political miscalculation.

Furthermore, his policy of "state socialism", aiming to act as a
 panacea for socialist discontent also proved to be a similar failure.
 For example, his Accident Insurance Act 1883, Work Insurance Act 1884
 and Old Age and Pensions Act of 1889, providing a state pension to those
 over 65, although may counter the traditional point of view that
 Bismarck's Germany was ~~the~~ ^{an} entirely autocratic and
 repressive, nevertheless failed to diminish the SPD's presence in
 the Reichstag, with their number of parliamentary seats doubling
 from 1871-1890. Again, this can be seen as a failure for Bismarck,
 as it proved discordant with his aims of "crushing
 parliamentarianism with parliamentarianism" and reveals
 the precarious nature of the "juggles of absolutism".

Overall, although it is often oversimplified that while Bismarck's
 foreign policy asserted Germany's position on the international stage,
 he neglected his domestic policies of the Kulturkampf and anti-socialist



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campaigns, there does seem to be significant merit in the view that he failed to eliminate the parliamentary and social threat of the Zentrum and SPD. Nevertheless, while the anti-socialist campaign can be seen as a total failure for Bismarck, it seems that the Kulturkampf was a strategic move, highly in accordance with his over-arching goal.



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Question 23: With reference to the period up to 1914, discuss the economic developments that took place in Russia during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II.

[Section 12: Imperial Russia, revolution and the establishment of the Soviet Union (1855 -1924)]

INTRO → but foreign capitalist
Bunge vshnegradsky ✓ → can't write
#URBAN → life expen
#RURAL → staying → life expen
Optimism vs pessimism
Russo-Japanese → styles
1904-1905

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During the reign of Alexander III, from 1881-1894, to and his reign of Nicholas 1894-1917, Russia undoubtedly underwent a period of economic reform, both in rural and urban life. Under the tenures of Bunge 1882-1887, Vshnegradsky 1887-92 and Cant Witte 1894 onwards, undoubtedly Russia progressed economically, particularly with regards to industry. Nevertheless, to suggest that the period of 1881-1914 was an economic miracle, ignores the fact that there was a serious period of industrial and agricultural decline in the 1900s, as well as the fact that these economic developments did not come with social reforms. Ultimately, the oscillation of such economic policies and their results would, as Peter Cratter and many Marxist historians argue, lead to the 1917 revolution, and the fact that an undercurrent of discontent due to the lack of genuine reform for living conditions.

Firstly, it seems that during the reign of Alexander III, there



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is much evidence to support James Simms' argument that there was economic development, especially in industry. For example, Finance Minister Vshnegradsky, ^{from 1887} under the mantra of "we ourselves shall not eat, but export", led to a threefold increase in Russian export of grain, leading to the budget of Russia becoming a surplus, thereby suggesting that the economy as a whole improved. Furthermore, the fact that such a development in industry persisted under Witte from 1892 ~~the~~ Russia led to growth rates of up to 8%, demonstrates a general improvement in the economy as a whole, further supported by the fact that he was able to stabilise the rouble.

Nevertheless, more recent historians have pointed out that much of the economic development in industry, was highly dependent on foreign capital. This is supported by the fact that foreign investment increased sevenfold, shown by the presence of the Baku oilfields in Georgia, Platt and Oldham of textiles along with the John Hughes street plant. The fact that these industries continued to make reparative profits, to an extent explains why under Alexander III, life expectancy remained at 27.25 years.

Following on from this, it seems that under Alexander III, there was an oscillation of policy with regard to the economic position of the peasants. For example, while Bunge, finance minister from 1881-1887 introduced measures such as the establishment of the Peasants' Land Bank in 1882, the abolition of the hated poll tax in 1885, suggests that despite being bound to the mir politically from 1889, peasants were increasingly gaining economic rights. Furthermore, the fact that such policies persisted under Nicholas preceding the 1905 revolution such as the 1902 cancellation of redemption payments, which had racked up peasant debt at 6% interest since 1861, along with the expansion of the land bank suggests that, as Hans Rogge does that the overall



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position of the peasantry did improve under both Alexander and Nicholas.

Following from this, Stolypin's subsequent economic policy following 1905 revolution, focusing again on the peasants known as "the wayfarer on the strong and sober" can also be seen as a further extension of peasant rights. The legislation of 1907, allowing peasants to leave the commune and farm individually as well as the 1910 duma

legislation granting more economic independence, supports the view that the peasant economy continued to develop from 1905-1914.

Nevertheless, the qualified success of such measures ~~is shown~~ for the peasantry from 1881-1914 is shown by the socio-economic discontent such as the 1899 famine, 1901 famine, the 1903-04 years of the Red Chertok, as well as the fact that Stolypin had to use his

"necker" to assassinate over 2,500 peasants, which all imply that although the state may have adopted measures to reform peasant economics, they failed to effect a material change in conditions.

Similarly, the fact that the industrialism under Bunge, or Vshnegradsky and Witte rapidly declined following 1899 strongly suggests that the development was unsustainable. Given that, as Fige rightly points out, a contributing factor to the 1905 revolution was poor working conditions, in spite of 1887 and 1885 labour legislation, suggests that this economic development came with a strong caveat.

Furthermore, the fact that the number of urban workers increased from 4% of the population to 12% of the population from 1894 to 1914, further supports this fact. Moreover, the fact that the growth rate rapidly declined from 8% in 1900 to a mere 1% in 1910 is a further indicator of this. Not only does this indicate a lack of sustainable development in the economy as a whole, but the fact that by May 1914 more workers were on strike than in 1905 suggests that this lack of economic progress, had a



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direct impact on the longevity of the Tsarist dynasty. Although Kochan, among many other optimist historians argue that "the Tsar entered the war in fairly good order", it seems more plausible, given these dire economic conditions as highlighted, to adopt Service's more balanced argument that the economy, and indeed Tsarism itself remained a "truly creaking structure of power." * (SEE BELOW CONCLUSION)

Overall, while optimist historians such as Kochan and Abraham point to economic development in the period of 1881-1914 to conclude that the war was the decisive factor in the February revolution of 1917, it seems far more realistic to suggest that although there was substantial economic development, in both industry and agriculture alike, both Tsars failed to complement such policies with social reform, meaning that the benefits of such economic growth was not felt by the population. Although Tsarist Russia became the fourth largest industrial economy, and the Trans-Siberian the socio-economic developments were limited.

* Furthermore, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 only worsened such problems, as the 1/3 of all spending throughout the period 1905-1914 went on reparations, and the weaknesses of the 53,000km long Trans-Siberian railway had been exposed. Thus, to an extent, stifled further development, and made it clear that the 45% of GDP going on the military was to no avail.



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